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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This case is about money, specifically attorney's fees. The case involves a settled dispute 
over under-insured motorist (UIM) coverage, with the issue of fees still in dispute. This case is 
about a family that lost its only son in a tragic accident and who were forced to file a lawsuit 
before their insurer made them an offer on disputed policies. This case is also about what an 
Idahoan must provide to an insurer in order to collect amounts justly due on an insurance policy. 
b. Course of Proceedings. 
On January 26, 2010, the Hollands filed a complaint against Metropolitan Property and 
Casualty Insurance Co. and MetLife Auto and Home ( collectively "MetLife"). R., pp. 8-15 On 
February 9, 2010, the Hollands filed a motion for attorney's fees, memorandum, and affidavit of 
counsel.1 R., pp. 16-41 On March 2, 2010, MetLife noticed its appearance and filed the parties' 
stipulated I.R.C.P. 41(a)(l) motion. R., pp. 42-44 On March 3, 2010, the court dismissed the 
underlying claims, with prejudice, based upon the parties' stipulated motion. R., pp. 45-48 
On April 12, 2010, MetLife answered the Hollands' complaint. R., pp. 49-53 Thereafter, 
MetLife moved to enforce a February 3, 2010 agreement and dismiss the case. R., pp. 78-80 
On June 2, 2010, oral argument was held on the parties' motions. Tr., p. 4, 1. 1 
1 Hollands acknowledge the awkward procedural posture of the motion having been filed before MetLife's 
appearance in the case; however, would ask this Court to note the unique factual development of this case in that 
MetLife made an offer almost immediately after being sued, and this offer lead to the settlement of all underlying 
claims in the lawsuit. R., pp. 45-48; see also R., pp. 54-58 The Hollands would also ask the Court to note that they 
attempted to work with MetLife to resolve the fees issue short of court involvement and set the motion for hearing 
after they were told the issue could only be resolved by the court. R., pp. 63-63, ~ 14; see also R., pp. 380-81 






On July 20, 2010, the district court entered an opinion and order which enforced the 
agreement, denied the motion for attorney's fees, and dismissed the case. R., pp. 385-416 On 
August 2, 2010, the Hollands filed a motion for reconsideration. R., pp. 465-546 The court heard 
oral argument on the motion to reconsider on September 29, 2010. Tr., p. 44 
On October 6, 2010, the court issued its opinion and order denying reconsideration and 
entered a final judgment in favor of MetLife. R., pp. 668-94 The court's decision was based upon 
three facts: 1) the Hollands' claims constituted a "moving target," 2) there was no case law cited 
to support the argument that the time frames under the policies could be aggregated, and finally 
3) that it was MetLife or Paukert who came up with the coverage theory. R., p. 693 
On October 12, 2010, the Hollands timely appealed. R., pp. 700-704 
c. Statement of Facts. 
On October 25, 2009, Benjamin Charles Holland ("Ben") tragically passed away due to a 
violent auto accident, when an under-insured motorist fell asleep at the wheel, left the road, and 
collided with a tree at a high rate of speed. R., p 10, ,r 6, see also R., p. 158 
On or about November 10, 2009, the Hollands, through their attorney Kinzo Mihara 
("Mihara"), tendered notice of claim and proof of loss under Ben's UIM auto policy to MetLife. 
Id., ,i,r 9, 10, and 16; see also R., pp. 466-67, ,i 7 The proof ofloss was verbal, and Mihara 
provided MetLife a copy of the police report for the accident, which contained all of the 
accident's particulars. Tr., p. 76, 1. 9-22; see also R. pp. 466-67, ,i 7 This claim was issued claim 
number FRD 373130 (the "initial" claim). R., p. 91, ,i 3 The same day, MetLife agent, Daneice 
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Davis, ("Davis") sent Mihara a letter which requested further "pertinent" information she needed 
to process the claim. Id.; see also R., pp. 148-49; see also R., p. 91, ,r 3 
On November 1 i\ 2009, Mihara provided documentation in response to Davis' request. 
R., p. 133, ,r 7; see also R, pp. 151-178 On December 1, 2009, Mihara supplemented his 
response with an Allstate letter tendering the limits of the tortfeasor's auto policy. R., pp. 180-88 
On December 7, 2009, Davis and Mihara had a telephone conversation where Davis told 
Mihara that she believed the "initial" claim could be concluded with MetLife paying "policy 
limits." R., p. 91, ,r 3 Mihara told Davis that the matter could not be concluded as the Hollands 
were making "additional" claims under other policies. Id. The other policies were Greg and 
Kathy Hollands' automobile policy and a motorcycle policy. R., p. 92, ,r 6; see also R, p. 499; 
see also R., p. 220 The motorcycle policy covered Ben's motorcycle and listed him as the only 
driver. Id. Both policies had significantly higher UIM coverage limits than Ben's auto policy but 
which were also governed by MetLife policy MPL 6010-000, the same policy that governed the 
"initial claim." R., pp. 497-502 The two "additional" claims were assigned claim numbers FRD 
408440 and FRD 408370. R., p. 92, ,r 6 Ben was listed as a household driver for both policies, 
and again, was the motorcycle policy's only listed driver. R., p. 494 
On January 8, 2010, Davis determined she could not affirm or deny coverage and 
retained Kathleen Paukert ("Paukert"), to provide a coverage opinion.2 R., p. 92, ,r 5 Importantly, 
2 MetLife may argue that there was agreement that Davis would not begin to review the "additional" claims until her 
return; however, the argument is immaterial, the argument has no impact on the timing of payment for the "initial" 
claim, nor does it explain why other MetLife personnel were working the claims in her absence. R., pp. 639-44 
January 8th is a mere two days after Davis returned from vacation, and one day after Davis received Mihara's letter 
demanding a coverage decision. R., pp. 91-92, ~~~ 4, 5, 6 The claim file entry of December 9, 2009 states: "Daneice 








Davis had enough documentation to send Paukert material for her to produce a coverage opinion 
for the "additional" claims. Id. As of January 8, 2010, MetLife requested no further information, 
documentation, or explanation of the loss or the claims. 
On January 14, 2010, Paukert agreed that MetLife would make a coverage decision by 
January 22, 2010. R., p. 192 The same day, Mihara sent Paukert a 17 page memo via email that 
memorialized that he would not to take action against MetLife until after January 22, 2010, and 
which detailed several theories of coverage. 3 R., p. 60, ,r 5 The subject line of the email read: 
"Holland v. MetLife (Unfiled)."4 Mihara copied Davis via fax. Id. R., p. 211 The memo 
requested payment of undisputed amounts. R., p.192 Mihara requested payment of an hourly fee 
in consideration for agreeing not to take action against MetLife. R., pp. 190-91 Paukert quickly 
denied Mihara's fee request. 5 R., p. 211 
January 22, 2010 came and went without a coverage decision or payment for either the 
"initial" or "additional" claims. 6 R., p. 11, ,r,r 7-8 Importantly, on January 22, 2010, Paukert 
requested more time in order to come to a coverage decision. R., p. 392 Mihara denied her 
is ordering certified copies ... and referring to defense counsel to review to assist in determining coverage" R., p. 510 
The one month delay in referral to defense counsel is unexplained. 
3 MetLife's claim file acknowledges that there could be coverage under at least one theory advocated by Mihara. R., 
p. 643 ("is a "resident relative" of the parents' policies by virtues of having some factors related to a residence ... ") 
In essence, Mihara's coverage analysis determined that because Ben was listed as a household driver, he was a 
resident of the Hollands' household and therefore entitled to coverage under one or both of the other two policies by 
virtue of being a "resident relative" - Ben was also a named insured under the motorcycle policy by virtue of being 
the lone driver named in the declarations, and by paying the policy's premiums. R., pp. 202-04; see also R., p. 206 
MetLife has claimed privilege and withheld its theories. R., p. 636 
4 
The subject line of the emails Mihara sent to Paukert should clear any dispute as to what the Hollands' intentions 
were ifno coverage answer were received by January 22, 2010. 
5 
" ... I do not think Met has taken an unreasonable amount of time looking at this issue. Also, I have no idea why 
you think they would pay your attorney fees." R., p. 211 
6 
The foregoing is despite the fact that the Hollands had, in writing, asked for payments of amounts not in dispute on 
January 14, 2010. R., p. 192 ("please forward the amounts uncontested to my care at the address above ... ") 
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request. Id. On January 25, 2010, Paukert stated that it was her "final opinion" that the policies 
did not provide coverage. R., pp. 61-62, ,r 8 It became apparent that the Hollands could soon 
become defendants in a declaratory judgment action. Tr., p. 23, 1. 11-14; see also R., p. 118-19 
Interestingly, MetLife, intentionally chose not to bring such an action. Tr., p. 23, 1. 11-14 
On January 26, 2010, the Hollands promptly filed suit. R., pp. 8-15 The Hollands claimed 
entitlement to statutory attorney's fees. Id. The Hollands made several averments of fact to 
support their entitlement. Id. On January 29, 2010, Davis, was told by another MetLife agent that 
MetLife had been sued. R., p. 92, ,r 8 Davis requested Paukert check on this fact. Id. Paukert 
affirms that she did follow up, but that her assistant was unable to find the lawsuit. R., p. 98, ,r 
25 Neither Davis nor Paukert bothered to ask Mihara about the lawsuit. R., p. 399 Incredibly, on 
January 29, 2010, Paukert and MetLife realized that MetLife had UIM exposure under the 
motorcycle policy and Ben's auto policy.7 R., p. 517 The claim file states: 
reviewed (sic) this matter once again. I concur with DC Paukert that we have a 
$150k new lTIM exposure under the mtorocyle (sic) file and am willing to tender 
it at this time. this (sic) is in addition to the $50k new UIM exposure under Ben's 
own Auto policy. I do not believe there is any coverage under the parent's Auto 
policy, but if there was, the payout would still be capped to the higher limit and it 
would not create an additional liability for us. 
Id. (emphasis added) On February 2, 2010, Paukert made Mihara the following offer via email: 
This letter confirms Met is offering your client the limits of the motorcycle 
po]icy minus the offset. It is my understanding, the Motorcycle po]icy is 
$250,000.00 and you received $50,000.00 from the tortfeasor. Therefore, Mets 
offer is $200,000.00. Obviously, we will require a full release. 
7 C.f "Were the Defendants in this matter seeking to settle with the Plaintiffs in response to the lawsuit, there might 
be an argument that attorney's fees are applicable." R., p. 363; see also Tr., p. 28, l. 14 to L 18 Further, Paukert had 
finished her "coverage opinion" on January 27, 2010 -thus, the notice of suit on January 29, 20 JO impacted 
MetLife's coverage opinion for new UIM exposure. R., p. 97, ,r 4; see also R., p. 517; see also R., p. 636 







R., pp.67-68 (emphasis added) The offer was for the two disputed "additional" claims. R., p. ,r,r 
26, 27 The offer was silent as to attorney's fees. R., pp. 67-68 The email did not attach a draft 
release or set forth whether the term "full release" envisioned release of any legal fees. Id. Upon 
receipt of the offer, Mihara made Paukert aware the Hollands had recently entered a fee 
agreement with him. R., p. 62, ,r 9 Paukert admits that Mihara could have also advised her on 
February 2, 2010 that he had filed a lawsuit. R., p. 63, ,r 12 Paukert did not thereafter set forth 
that her offer was inclusive of fees. The next day, on February 3, 2010, Mihara sent Paukert an 
acceptance: "Please let this letter confirm that my clients accept MetLife's offer of $200,000. My 
clients will sign a full release of their claims against MetLife ... " R., pp. 62-63, ,r 11 The two 
attorneys immediately began to dispute whether the agreement was inclusive of fees. Id., at ,r 12; 
see also R., pp. R., p. 224-25 Despite the dispute, MetLife agreed to pay the $200,000. R., p. 224 
On February 9, 2010, MetLife issued two checks in the amounts of $150,000 and 
$50,000, for claims FRD 408370 (motorcycle policy) and FRD 370130 (Ben's auto policy), 
respectively. R., pp. 235-36 Each check contained a notation that the checks were for, 
"PAYMENT OF BENEFITS UNDER UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR LOSS OF I 0-25-09." 
Id. (emphasis added) The same day, Mihara filed the Hollands' motion seeking attorney's fees, 
supported by a memorandum that incorporated his affidavit. R., pp. 16-41 
On February 12, 2010, the two checks dated February 9, 2010 were delivered to Mihara 
along with a draft release. R., p. 230 MetLife retained another attorney, William Schroeder 
("Schroeder"), for the defense of the lawsuit. R., pp. 238-58; see also R., pp. 376-77 While not in 









agreement on each other's release language, Schroeder and Mihara quickly realized that the 
remaining issue could be that of fees. R., p. 258 On February 16,2010, Schroeder asked that 
Mihara not disburse the checks until both attorneys had an opportunity to draft a "mutually-
agreeable," "full release," which they were later able to do. 8 R., p. 258; see also R., pp. 54-56 
The release expressly reserved the issue of the Hollands' entitlement to attorney's fees. 
Id. Mihara continuously expressed interest in resolving the issue short of court involvement. R., 
p.64,115; see also R., pp. 227-28; see also R., pp. 238-39; see also R., pp. 376-77 In addition 
to recovering $200,000 ($150,000 on the motorcycle policy and $50,000 on Ben's auto policy), 
the Hollands recovered a complete subrogation waiver from MetLife. R., pp. 54-56 On February 
23, 2010, Schroeder authorized distribution of the checks once the release was signed. R., p. 241 
On March 1, 2010, Schroeder entered an appearance. R., p. 243; see also R., pp. 42-43 
On March 2, 2010, Schroeder filed the parties' Rule 41(a)(l)(ii) stipulated motion. Id. The 
stipulation was for dismissal with prejudice while reserving the issue of fees. Id., at pp. 45-4 7 
The stipulation was based upon the fact that, " ... the parties have fully resolved all claims in this 
matter except for the pending motion for attorney fees ... " Id. The court signed the stipulated 
order, and the clerk entered it the next day. Id. Mihara agreed to allow Schroeder until March 15, 
2010 to conduct legal research.9 R., p. 243 On March 16, 2010, Schroeder advised Mihara that 
8 At oral argument, Schroeder revealed that MetLife's true purpose in obtaining the release was to protect itself from 
potential liability for bad faith. Tr., p. 21, I. 7 to I. 23 
9 It is important to note that Schroeder requested time to do research as the theory that fees were precluded by the 
earlier February 2 and 3, 2010 emails was not developed until after the parties' attorneys had jointly drafted and 
agreed upon a release and signed a joint motion and stipulated order. It is also important to note that the parties had 
resolved the issue of what the term "full release" meant through the negotiation and drafting of the settlement 
release attached to MetLife's answer. R., p. 258 
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the fee issue could only be resolved by the court. R., p. 3 81 On April 6, 2010, Mihara told 
Schroeder that he had waived all objections by not timely objecting. R., p. 384 
Six days later, on April 12, 2010, MetLife filed its answer. R., pp. 49-58 The answer did 
not deny paragraphs 1 to 33 of the Hollands' complaint or even contain a general denial. Id. The 
parties' jointly negotiated and drafted release was attached to the answer. Id. 
Oral argument was held on June 2, 2010. Tr., p. 3 Schroeder addressed I.R.C.P. 54, and 
despite having signed a Rule 41(a)(l)(ii) stipulation, he asserted that there had never been a 
judgment entered. Tr., p. 28, 1. 19 top. 30, 1. 6 
On July 20, 2010, the district court issued its initial memorandum decision and order. R., 
pp. 385-416 In essence, the court held that it would enforce the settlement agreement because, in 
its view, the Hollands provided "proof ofloss," but failed to provide sufficient "proof ofloss." 
R., p. 412 The Hollands moved the court to reconsider. R, pp. 465-546 The Hollands asked the 
court to rule on their Rule 54 argument. 10 R., p. 538; see also R., p. 611 
In the memorandum and affidavit in support of their motion for the court to reconsider, 
the Hollands pointed out the voluminous amount of information they provided to MetLife in 
support of their claims. Id. The Hollands also provided the declarations pages of the policies and 
a copy of the policy terms that governed all the claims made. R., pp. 469-502 
On October 6, 2010, the district court issued its memorandum decision and order denying 
reconsideration. R., pp. 668-94 The court held that its decision was discretionary. R., p. 674 
Based on the information provided, the court retreated from its initial ruling and held that this 
10 The court intentionally did not rule on the argument before it. R., p. 689 
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was not a "proof of loss" case, but was now a "coverage" case, and the Hollands could not 
recover because the coverage theory had been created by MetLife or Paukert. R., pp. 676-683 
The Hollands timely appealed. R., pp. 700-704 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(a) Did the district court err when it held that the Hollands had failed to prove entitlement to 
attorney's fees pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839(1) and/or (2)? 
(b) Did the district court err by granting MetLife's motion to enforce the settlement agreement? 
(c) Did the district court err when it held that MetLife had not waived objection to the Hollands' 
claim to attorney's fees pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(e)(6)? 
( d) Did the district court err when it denied the Hollands summary judgment and held that the 
factual allegations set forth in the complaint were not admitted pursuant to LR.C.P. 8(d)? 
(e) Whether the Hollands are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839(1) and/or (2) 
and the LA.R. for this appeal? 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Interpreting an attorney-fee statute and whether it applies to the facts of a specific case 
are issues of law that an appellate court freely reviews. Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
13 8 Idaho 244, 246, 61 P .3d 601, 603 (2002) In construing a statute, a court may examine the 
language used, the reasonableness of proposed interpretations, and the policy behind it. Id. On 
appeal, a reviewing court is not bound by legal conclusions of a lower court and is free to draw 
its own conclusions from the facts presented. Mutual of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851, 852, 
908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995) 
Interpretation of a contract, and whether a contract is ambiguous is also an issue oflaw. 
Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393, 396 (2007) 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 9 
Likewise, the question of compliance with the rules of procedure is one of law. Harney v. 
Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904, 906-07, 781 P.2d 241, 243-44 (Ct.App.1989) 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no dispute of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Callies v. 
O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 216 P.3d 130 (2009) A mere scintilla of evidence or slight doubt of the 
facts is not sufficient to create an issue. Id. In an appeal from a summary judgment decision, the 
appellate standard of review is the same standard used by the lower court. Id. In any case which 
will be tried to the court, a trial judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment, but instead, can arrive at the most probable inferences 
to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 897, 
204 P.3d 532, 537 (Ct. App. 2009) An appeals court freely reviews inferences drawn by a lower 
court to determine whether the record reasonably supports those inferences. Id. If the evidence 
reveals no disputes of material fact, what remains is a question oflaw. Cordova v. Bonneville Co. 
Joint Sch. Dis. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637,639, 167 P.3d 774, 776 (2007) An appellate court freely 
reviews a lower court's resolution of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether 
a party was entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Callies, supra, 216 P.3d at 135 If undisputed 
facts exist that lead to disposition as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. 
Mere denials unaccompanied by admissible facts, and affidavits of counsel based upon 
hearsay rather than upon personal knowledge, are insufficient to raise genuine issues of material 
fact Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878,882,693 P.2d 1080, 1084 (Ct. App. 1984) 
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The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is discretionary. Coeur 
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank ofN Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 
(1990) When considering a motion to reconsider, a court should take into account new facts or 
information that bear on the correctness of its prior order. Id. When a court's discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts an inquiry to determine: (1) whether 
the court perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion, consistent with legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) 
VI. ARGUMENT 
(a) The district court erred to hold that the Hollands were not entitled to attorney's fees 
pursuant to I.e.§ 41-1839(1) and/or (2). 
1. The Hollands complied with I.e.§ 41-1839(1) and are thus entitled to recover 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The real issues in this case are what proof of loss is an insured Idahoan required to 
provide to an insurer under Idaho law, and whether there are any public policy implications? 
The applicable statute reads: 
Any insurer issuing any policy ... , which shall fail for a period of thirty (3 0) days 
after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy ... , to pay to the 
person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy ... , shall in any 
action or in any arbitration thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in 
this state or in any arbitration ... , pay such further amount as the court shall 
adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action or arbitration ... 
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J.C.§ 41-1839(1) 11 (emphasis added) The starting point of statutory interpretation is the wording 
of the statute, and a court will give the statute's language its plain, obvious and rational meaning. 
Martin, supra, at 246, 603 The legislature's use of the word "shall" denotes the statute's 
mandatory nature. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) 
The statute does not require an insured provide legal theory as part of a proof of loss. J.C. 
§ 41-183 9(1) Likewise, the 3 0 days is not tolled while a benevolent insurer pushes for more 
coverage and its attorneys struggle with the interpretation of its own policies. Id. There are no 
burden-shifting provisions in the statute. Id. There is no requirement to make a claim. Id. There 
is no requirement that the insurer have notice of the lawsuit. Id. 
Before a plaintiff may recover fees under the statute, it must be shown that: ( 1) the 
insured provided proof of loss as required by the policy~ and (2) the insurer failed to pay the 
amount justly due within 30 days after receiving proof ofloss. Martin, supra at 24 7, 604 The 
purpose of J.C. § 41-183 9 is to provide incentive for insurers to timely settle just claims, without 
the insured's need for an attorney's services. Id. at 247-48, 604-05 The statute merely provides 
compensation to prevent a recovery from being diminished by legal fees. Id. 
The Supreme Court in Brinkman stated: 
The documentation is the "proof." The explanation of physical and/or financial 
injury is the "loss." The insurer will determine its liability with the knowledge 
that it must be fair and accurate or suffer the consequences. 
11 
J.C. § 41-1839, was amended in 2010 by the Legislature to add that attorney's fees incurred in arbitration, prior to 
a lawsuit being filed, were recoverable. See H.B. 593: Minutes of House Judiciary, Rules, and Administration 
Committee on February 25, 2010. (Representative Luker's comments); see also Statement of Purpose 






Brinkmanv.Aidlns. Co., 115Idaho346,350-51, 766P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988)Further,ifan 
insurer does not request a specific "proof of loss," the insured is under no duty to provide one. 
Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 755,758,947 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1997) (citing 
Brinkman) In fact, it is the insurer's duty to affirm or deny "coverage," and the failure to do so 
within a reasonable time is an unfair claim settlement practice or possibly even an act of bad 
faith. LC.§ 41-1329(5); see also White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 98, 730 P.2d 
1014, 2018 (1986) ("The insurer evaluates the claim, determines whether it falls within the 
coverage provided ... ") The insured-insurer relationship is one "characterized by elements of 
public interest, adhesion and fiduciary responsibility." White, supra at 99 (quotes in original) 
The Supreme Court has explained that a proof of loss need not prove damages with 
precision nor conclusively prove the insurer's liability for the loss. Boe! v. Stewart Title Guar. 
Co., 137 Idaho 9, 14, 43 P.3d 768, 773 (2002) In Boe!, a single explanatory letter was enough 
proof of loss to give the insurer an opportunity to investigate and determine its liability. Id. 
If an insured has more than one policy with the company, satisfactory notice or proofs 
given with respect to one policy constitute compliance with the requirement of notice or proofs 
as to the others. C.J.S., INSURANCE § 1787 (2007) Likewise, an insurer may not object to a proof 
of loss for the first time after a complaint has been filed. Id. 
The material facts related to this issue are: 1) what proof of loss does the policy require, 
2) what information was provided, 3) when was the information provided, 4) when did MetLife 
pay, and 5) what standard and reasoning did the court apply to deny the Hollands' motions? 
The policy in this case provides, in relation to "proof of loss:" 
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.~ 
I. 
I . . 
I 
You or someone on your behalf must notify us as soon as possible of any accident 
or loss. The notification should include as many details as possible, including the 
names and addresses of drivers, injured persons and witnesses, the time, place, 
and circumstances of the accident or loss. We may require it in writing. 
R., p. 490 The policy language does not require a legal "theory of coverage." R., p. 490 Thus, 
under the language of Anderson, supra, the Hollands had no duty to provide one. 
Oral proof of loss of Ben's death and other necessary information was given to MetLife 
on or about November 10, 2009. R, p. 10, ,r,r 9, 10; see also R., pp. 466-67, ,r 7; see also R., p. 
91, ,r 3 The oral proof ofloss was followed with a copy of the accident's police report. Id.; see 
also Tr., p. 7 6, 1. 15 to 1. 20 MetLife asked for further "pertinent" information, in writing, the 
same day. R., p. 91, ,r 3; see also R., pp. 148-49 MetLife's request recognizes the accident, the 
date of loss, and the fact of Ben's death. R., pp. 148-49 Davis provided Mihara with a form dated 
November 10, 2009 related to Ben's salary. R., p. 144; see also R., p. 161; see also R., p. 166 It 
is undisputed that Mihara, gave Davis the information that she asked for on November 17, 2009. 
R., p. 151-78 Mihara' s letter set forth the date and time of death, the name of the negligent party 
(the driver and also an injured person and witness), and the negligent party's insurance carrier. 
R., pp. 153-54 The enclosed death certificate noted the location, date, time, and circumstances of 
the death ( as a result of a "once vehicle crash into a tree"), and that the cause of death was severe 
head, neck, and chest trauma. R., p. 158 The accident was extremely violent and Ben's death 
occurred almost immediately; hence there was no medical treatment or any bills outstanding. R., 
p. 153 MetLife's employment form was completed and returned. R., p. 166 This was enough 
information and documentation that Davis was ready to discuss tender of the limits of the "initial 











claim" policy when the "additional claims" were made on December 7, 2009. R., p. 91, 'I[ 3 
Further, Davis had enough material to request a coverage opinion from Paukert for the 
"additional" claims on January 8, 2010. R., p. 92, ,r,r 5 and 6 
It is important to note that MetLife has not alleged the Hollands failed to provide any 
information requested, or otherwise failed to comply with any of the applicable policies' 
provisions. The court, likewise, discussed the policy language related to proof of loss in its 
decisions but could not cite to a single policy provision that the Hollands failed to comply with. 
Upon being faced with the policy in the record, MetLife' s argument was, incredibly, that the 
policy's provisions did not control and that the information required was merely preliminary: 
The various provisions noted by Plaintiffs ask for information, including, but not 
limited to: (a) details of the accident and/or injuries, or death, (b) names and 
addresses of drivers, (c) injured persons and witnesses, and (d) circumstances of 
the accident... Thus, the foregoing provisions ask for notice of the incident, 
preliminary documents, and information, while at the same time reserving various 
rights, including but not limited to: (a) the right to review medical records, 
reports, and expenses, (b) the right to have the insurer's physicians examine the 
insured, and importantly, ( c) the right to require Plaintiffs to "submit to and 
provide all details concerning loss information through written or recorded 
statements or examinations under oath as often as [MetLife] reasonably may 
require" (Ibid.) 
Ultimately, the policy provisions cited by Plaintiffs provide for preliminary 
documents and information needed by the insurer, but at the same time recognize 
that further documentation, information, and details may be necessary ... 
R., pp. 559-60 (emphasis added) 12 MetLife's argument discounts the fact that it exercised its 
reserved rights through Davis' November 10, 2009 letter requesting the death certificate, funeral 
bills, wage information, tax records, adverse carrier's tender of policy limits, etc. R., pp. 148-49 
12 Please note that it was the Hollands who put policy MPL 60 l 0-000 in the record. R., p. 466, ,r 3 MetLife did not 
put the policy in the record because the Hollands had complied with all of its terms. MetLife's argument cited above 






The only evidence that MetLife has marshaled to oppose the Hollands' contention that 
they supplied adequate proof of loss in November, 2009 are the affidavits of Paukert and Davis. 
R., pp. 59-66; see also R., pp. 90-94; see also R., pp. 95-99; see also R., pp. 128-31 Davis' 
affidavits do not state the Hollands failed provide adequate proof of loss. R., p. 91, ~ 3 Paukert 
admits that she was not retained until January 8, 2010, and therefore, she could not have first-
hand knowledge as to the events of November of 2009. R., p. 60, ~ 3 None of the affidavits show 
there is dispute as to the adequacy of information given in November, 2009. Therefore, there is 
no dispute of material fact, and this is an issue of law. 
In this case, the proof of loss undisputedly sufficient for the "initial" claim should have 
sufficed for the "additional" claims as well. C.J.S. INSURANCE § 1787 (2007) All three claims 
were governed by the same policy language and were based upon the same loss. R., p. 497-502 
(policy MPL 6010-000 governed-for policy nos. 1193308780 (Greg and Kathy's auto policy), 
1193308771 (Ben's motorcycle policy), and 0234338980 (Ben's auto policy)) Intuitively, the 
same proof of loss should apply to all claims. Again, the "initial claim" was made on November 
10, 2009, and "additional claims" were made December 7, 2009. R., p. 91, ~ 3 
In this case, the district court's July and October, 2010 memorandum opinions and orders 
set forth the standard that the court used to rule on the motions before it. The court wrote: 
is contrary to Idaho law in that an insurer cannot delay payment of a claim based upon an alleged need for further 
documentation that would otherwise contain the same information. LC. § 41-1329(12) MetLife has still not 
expounded upon what Mihara should have provided or how such information otherwise affected its coverage theory. 
An insurer should timely notify the insured as to what the proper proof of loss should be so that the insured could 
have time to correct it. C.J.S. INSURANCE § 1779 (2007) Likewise, an insurer may not claim that a proof of loss is 
insufficient for the first time after a complaint has been filed. Id. Further, at no point prior to the lawsuit did MetLife 
allege that the "proof of loss" was deficient. 
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The district court's decision to award attorney's fees is a discretionary decision, 
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford ... 
R., p. 390; see also R., p. 674 (emphasis added) Thus, the court erred from the very outset of its 
analysis and did not recognize that the application of the statute was mandatory .13 
In its initial memorandum decision and order, the court set forth three reasons why it 
refused to award the Hollands statutory attorney's fees: first, there were separate claims made 
under separate policies at separate times (moving target) (R., p. 397), second, Mihara provided 
no law to support that the time from November to December, 2009 should be aggregated with 
the time from January to February, 2010 (because of the separate claims on separate policies) 
(R., p. 398), and lastly, if Paukert came up with the theory of coverage, there was no 
"unreasonable" refusal to pay by MetLife and the Hollands would have therefore failed to meet 
the "proof of loss" burden of Brinkman and Greenough (Id.; see also R., p. 415). 14 
In its decision and order denying the Hollands' motion for reconsideration, the court 
switched the basis of its reasoning for denying the Hollands relief under the statute from 
inadequate "proof ofloss" to a "coverage" issue. R., p. 460, c.f, R., pp. 680-81 Apparently and 
incredibly, the court's "coverage" approach is that if an insurer denies coverage, or otherwise 
does not affirm coverage, the burden shifts back to the insured to come up with another coverage 
13 Again, the court's decision to grant the motion to enforce the "settlement," and dismiss the attorney's fees, was 
not based upon contractual construction principles, or upon any factor enumerated by statute, case law, but rather 
that: "[t]he following had everything to do with the Court's decision: 1) moving target by Hollands, 2) no case law 
supporting aggregating the time periods for the three policies and 3) theory of additional coverage was arrived at by 
Pauker (sic) or at least MetLife and not by Mihara on behalf of Hollands." R., p. 693 
14 The court was bound to come to its conclusions from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 
supra, 897, 537 The fact of who came up with the theory ofrecovery is irrelevant as the parties settled the coverage 
issue prior to litigating the fees issue, and the issue of which attorney came up with the correct theory is clearly 
disputed. R., pp. 54-56 Therefore, the court's findings are inconsistent with applicable legal standards. 
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theory the insurer would agree with before the thirty days would begin to run. Tr. P. 71, 1. 4 to P. 
72, 1. 6 The court stated at oral argument on reconsideration: 
THE COURT: They told you that their initial assessment had indicated that there 
was no coverage. It's up to you under this - under the statute that shifts the 
burden back and forth to come up with a theory -
MR. MIHARA: I -
THE COURT: to start the thirty days running. Proof of loss is what starts the 
thirty days running, and they're saying that you identified these policies. That's 
great. They put the ball back in your court, saying we're not seeing the theory 
that would allow for this, the theory you're advocating, but they went to work 
and tried to find some other theory. I mean if you look at 41-183 9 and what it 
takes to start the clock ticking and it's - it's on the insured to submit the proof of 
loss. Since they're the ones that were creative in coming up with the theory 
that would allow for recovery, it seems to me arguably the thirty days never 
began to run. 
MR. MIHARA: I would submit the opposite, Your Honor. I would submit under 
case law that liability and coverage are synonymous, Your Honor. If there's no 
coverage, there's no liability. 
Id. ( emphasis added) The court wrote in its opinion and order denying reconsideration: 
... this is not a "lack of information case", this is not a "proof of loss" case, 
this is a coverage case. And it is not facts or information or funeral bills that 
create any lack of information, it is Hollands' attorney Mihara not coming up 
with the theory of coverage under the policies, the interpretation of the policies 
that would lead to greater recovery for his client ... it was Paukert who did this ... 
or at least it was MetLife that came up with these theories. 
R., pp. 673-74 ( emphasis added)15 In addition, despite recognizing undisputed facts that 
adequate proof ofloss was provided for the "initial" claim, and that the claim was not paid 
within 30 days, the court still refused to award fees. R., p. 685-86 Thus, the court did not act in 
accordance with applicable legal standards by failing to comply with the statute's mandate. 
15 Cf The July, 2010 opinion read: "This Court is simply unable to find that Hollands have met their burden ... 
because Hollands submitted "proof of loss" but not a proof of loss which was "sufficient. .. to provide the insurer 
with enough information to allow ... a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability."" R., p. 460 
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The court did not cite any legal authority for how the alleged fact that Paukert came up 
with a coverage theory, as opposed to a theory offered by Mihara, impacted its analysis. 16 
Likewise, the court failed to cite to any case law or other legal authority that would imply that its 
"multiple claims, multiple policies" factor or that legal argument must be made for the 
aggregation of time had any rational relationship to the statute in question. Thus, the court 
improperly required an insured to conclusively prove liability, prior to filing a lawsuit. 17 
At oral argument, Schroeder argued that "proof of loss" in coverage disputes, under 
Idaho law, equates to "proof of liability:" 
In the setting where you have coverage there's no question as to what it means. It 
means proof of damages because coverage is accepted. In a coverage dispute, 
proof of loss really equates to proof of liability, the fact that there's liability under 
the policy to pay anything. 
Tr., p. 24, 1. 6-11 Incredibly, Schroeder stated that he could not find a case discussing "proof of 
loss" in a "coverage" matter and that this issue, in this case, was an issue of first impression. Tr., 
p. 21, 1.24 top. 22, 1. 16 MetLife's argument is relevant to Brinkman in that it is the insurer's 
duty to determine its "liability," and must do so with the knowledge that it must be fair and 
accurate or suffer the consequences. Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231 Both the district court's 
reasoning and Schroeder's arguments are directly at odds with U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Pappas' 
rejection of the idea that an insurer could determine one of I.C. § 41-1839(l)'s requirements: 
16 The Hollands' attorney's theories of coverage are in the record. R., pp. 192-208 The claim file reflects that 
MetLife thought at least one ofMihara's theories was tenable. R., p. 643 The issue of who came up with the theory 
of coverage is really irrelevant as MetLife concedes that there was coverage for at least one of the "additional" 
claims. R., p. 93; see also R., p. 98,127 MetLife's actual theories are withheld under claim of privilege. R., p. 636 
17 Boel sets forth explicitly that an insured need not conclusively establish the insurer's liability (i.e., coverage) with 
or through its proof of loss. Boel, supra, at 14, 773 Because none of the factors the court cited have any rational 
relationship to the statute in question or any case law, the court failed to come to its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 




Accepting Defendant's interpretation would basically render Idaho Code § 41-
1839(1) a toothless statutory tiger. Under Defendant's view, an insurer could 
simply decline to agree with its insured about the amount justly due, and then 
argue that lacking such an agreement, the statutory payment deadline did not 
operate. The Court declines to presume this sort of result was intended by the 
Idaho legislature in adopting Idaho Code § 41-1839( I). 
In re Jones, 40 I B.R. 456, 460 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) 
The court's written opinions and Schroeder's statements also disregard the case of 
Greenough that has been so voluminously cited by both parties and the court. 
Greenough was clearly a "proof ofloss," "coverage" case. Greenough v. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589,593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006) The only issue was 
whether Mr. Greenough was the driver, and hence, whether coverage applied. Id. The insurer 
demanded arbitration to determine the coverage issue. Id. Once the insurer determined that its 
theory of the case was incorrect, it tendered the policy's remaining limits. Id. Prior to the tender, 
the plaintiff filed suit. Id. In fact, the lone footnote to Greenough cites LC. 18-1329 for the 
proposition that it is the insurer's duty to investigate and determine its liability (i.e., whether 
there is "coverage") when claims are made. Id. at FNI The insured in Greenough was properly 
awarded attorney's fees on summary judgment pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839(1). Id. The only issue 
in Greenough was the date upon which interest ran. 18 Id. Like Greenough, the sole issue in 
Martin was coverage - whether the insurer had any "liability" to its insured, i.e., liability to pay 
anything due to the insured filing the complaint late. Martin, supra, at 24 7 Again, the insured in 
Martin was properly awarded attorney's fees upon appeal of the lower court's denial of fees. Id. 
18 Further, an insurer who fails to defend, or denies a claim, based upon a faulty theory of coverage is liable to its 
insureds. See Greenough; see also Pendlebury, infra, at 470 The Greenough insurer didn't contest the proofofloss 
on the coverage because, like in this case, coverage issue was settled via tender. Greenough, supra at 592 
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In this case, MetLife has argued, and the court has held, because MetLife eventually did 
what it had a duty to do, a duty to determine whether coverage applies and timely pay claims, it 
escapes liability for fees. This result is completely contrary to the purpose of the statute. 
To rule that an insured is required to produce a legal theory ofrecovery under a policy's 
terms would be to undo the very purpose and public policy of the statute. For instance, if a lay 
Idahoan were to make a claim under a policy; should that person be required or forced by law to 
come up with an applicable legal theory of coverage? If a lay person were to be required to do 
so, that person would likely retain an attorney to help come up with an applicable legal theory. If 
the insured were required to obtain counsel before the thirty day clock were to begin to run, then 
logically the attorney's fees incurred in coming up with the legal theory could not be recovered 
as the thirty day clock would not have started to run. Any fees incurred would likely be paid out 
of the eventual recovery, contrary to the purpose of the statute. 
To require that legal theory be supplied in support of a claim also would pre-suppose the 
insured would have knowledge of all applicable policies. In this case, we have an instance 
whereby a policy was obtained and paid for solely by a decedent. R., p. 644; see also R., pp. 511-
15 If the decedent's heirs did not know about the policy, but otherwise provided proper proof of 
loss to the insurer, the insurer should be required to pay on all applicable policies. 19 
If this Court were to let this decision were to stand, it would have an adverse impact upon 
future Idahoan insureds. The decision would be controlling precedent in the First Judicial 
19 As stated above, where an insured has more than one policy with the insurer, notice or proofs given as to one 
policy, if otherwise satisfactory, constitute compliance with the requirement of notice or proofs as to the others. 
C.J.S., INSURANCE§ 1787 (2007) There is no requirement that an insured make a claim. LC. §41-1839 (1) 






District, and could be cited as persuasive authority in other Judicial Districts. This Court cannot 
let insurers fail to pay past 30 days and require insureds bear the burden of legal fees they incur 
out of insurance proceeds they should have received within 30 days of providing proof of loss. If 
the Court were to uphold the court's decision, insurers would be able to dodge liability for 
attorney's fees by explicitly inserting provisions requiring legal theory in their policies. 
If the court's decision were to stand, the decision would effectively do away with the 
work product doctrine and require that otherwise protected theory be divulged to the insurer at 
least 30 days before litigation. This would put insureds on an unequal footing with insurers as 
insurers would have an extra 30 days, at least, to prepare opposition to their insureds' theories. 
In conclusion, because application of the statute is mandatory but was decided under a 
discretionary standard, the district court erred and applied an incorrect legal standard both on 
summary judgment and on reconsideration. Further, because the information and documentation, 
and the dates that they were provided to MetLife in November of 2009 are undisputed, 
application of the law to those facts is a matter of law that this Court freely reviews. 
As a matter oflaw, the Hollands would submit that they complied with LC. § 41-1839(1) 
and MetLife has failed to produce any admissible evidence to contradict the averments that the 
Hollands provided proper proof of loss prior to 30 days from when they were paid. 
2. MetLife could have avoided liability by complying with J.C.§ 41-1839(2). 
The issue is whether MetLife could have avoided attorney's fees by simply availing itself 
to the safeguard built into the statute? 
The applicable statute states: 






In any such action, if it is alleged that before the commencement thereof, a tender 
of the full amount justly due was made to the person entitled thereto, and such 
amount is thereupon deposited in the court, and if the allegation is found to be 
true, or if it is determined in such action that no amount is justly due, then no such 
attorney's fees may be recovered. 
LC.§ 41-1839(2) The Supreme Court in Martin, supra, interpreted sub-section two: 
The proper focus in this case is that a claim submitted to the insurer by its insured 
should be timely resolved. Under the statute, the insurance company has thirty 
days to tender an "amount justly due." The thirty days is not delayed or extended 
while the insurer invokes the right to arbitration under the insurance contract. The 
insurer should respond by tender of an amount within thirty days ... But if the 
insurance company makes no tender within thirty days, or makes a tender that is 
substantially less than the arbitrators' eventual award, the insurance company is 
liable for a reasonable amount of the insured's attorney fees, as compensation to 
make the insured whole. Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 89 Idaho 293, 404 
P.2d 634 (1965). The purpose of the statute is to cause the insurance company to 
timely make a reasonable offer and is not dependent on the arbitrators' eventual 
award. The insurance company acts at its peril in taking the risk not to tender an 
"amount justly due" but, instead, await the arbitration determination ... 
Martin, supra, at 248 (emphasis added) The Supreme Court in Anderson, supra, stated: 
Even in a disputed claim, however, the insurer must tender to the insured, or 
into court, the amount it feels is justly due. LC. § 41-1839(2). Thereafter, 
"[s]hould the insured fail to recover a sum in excess of the tender, then and in that 
event attorney fees are not assessable." Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 Idaho 
293, 301, 404 P .2d 634, 639 (1965). In this case, there was no tender at all. 
Anderson, supra, at 758 (over-ruled on other grounds) (emphasis added) 
In Pendlebury, supra, the Supreme Court held that an award under LC. § 41-
1839(2) was mandatory unless it is alleged that before lawsuit, the insurer tendered the 
full amount justly due into the court. Pendlebury v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 




















The only materia l facts related to this issue arc l) whether MetLife paid within 30 
days of receiving proof of loss~ and 2) whether Mc.tLife paid any amOWll inlo court. 
In this case, Mel Life m.adc no tender prior the lav.rsui1 atld has still evaded payin_.g fees. 
Me11 .ife concedes a1 1he lime the lawsuit was tiled, cove.rage and liability were at issue for the 
"additional"' claims made ii1 Decembe.i- of 2009. R .. p. l 13; see also R .• p. 315 MetLife admits 
that it fai led 10 tender the amount recovered, at any time prior to the lawsuit, R., p. 249 (RF A No. 
9) Likewise, lhere is no evidence 1hat MetLife tt:ndertd any amount in10 the coun. 
(fthis Court were to uphold the deClsion of the district court, insuretS could fail 10 1ender 
arnounts justly due 10 their ins11reds, fai l 10 tender aJ1y amount into the coun, and V.'ail until a 
lawsuit js fi led before 1hey pay- and evade statutory attorney's fees by simply aJleging that 
coverage was found under their legal theory versus the insurcds.20 insurers could a lso delay 
paymeo1 by con1inuously requesting more information in support of proofs of loss. Insurers with 
potential policy limits liability would be eocouraged to delay payment, p0ssibly up un1jl 1he eve 
of trial, the11 make an offer of policy limlts co,uingent upon the insureds waivi11g tl1eir 
entitlement to statutory fees. Thus, insurers could pocket tJ,c interest on large sums for years 
\\'lthout paying amounls justly due. and use litigation risk 10 bolster their inves.tmcn1s. 
In SUJn, the Hollands arc erui1led to an award of stalutory anomey's fees under I.C. § 41-
1839(2) because there is no dispute ll1at MetLife did not tender 1he amoum justly due. 10 the. 
Hollands prior to lhe case. and ahsenl agreement, into the coun prior to this lawsuit. 
» Again, .Metl.ife's 1bwries arc actually unknown as it hM whhheld lhem undt:, a t laun of privilege. I( ., p. 636 
Coincidcl)tly, Mcd .. lfc's final coverage lheC>ry "''as developed the d3y MetLife was told that it had betn sued. Id. C.f. 
-Wt:'fe 1he OerendMtS In 1his mane!' seeking IC> sen le whh 1he fl l.'1buiffs in reSpOf1sc 101hc tawwi1, 1bcrc might b~ an 
argume111 lba1 ~momey•s fee:$ are :applfoablc: · R,. p. 363; stte ,Js() Tr., p 28, I. J.t to I. 18 


















3. The Hollands clearly "prevailed" i:n Che underlying li«:igation. 
The issue is wheLher the district c-0un erred 10 find 1hat there was n dispute o.~ h) material 
fact on the issue of whethe.r the Hollands prevailed within the meaning of the statute? 
To prevail for the purposes of I.C. § 41 -1839. an insured must simply recover an amount 
grcmc:r than that tendered by the insurer prior to suit. Sfaatlumg v. Allstntc Ins. Co., 132 Jdaho 
705,711,979 P,2d 107, 113 (1999) An insured con recover by virtue ofa settlemen1. Parsons v, 
M11111al of£11umdaw In.;. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 745, 152 l'.3d 614,616 (2007) An appellate court 
can hold lhat a party prevailed as a mrmcr of law. Daisy A{anufecturing Co .. Inc. v. Paimba/1 
Sports, Inc., 134 ldaho 259,262,999 P.2d 914,917 (Ct. App. 2000) 
The material facts in relation to this issue arc; I) what amounl did MetLife lender prior to 
lhc lawsui1, and 2) what did 1he Hollands recover? 
Jn this c~e. Metl..ife conceded ut oral argument that under Parsons. supra. a senlerne,u 
could fix the amount due and owning. Tr.1 p. 22. I. )4 to I. 16 Likewise, MetLife admits that it 
did not tender any amount for UlM coverage prior to this lawsuit. R .. p. 249 (RF A 9) Coverage 
for 1he ·~addi1ional" claims was M issue at the 1ime the lawsuiL was fi led. R., p. 11 J; see also R., 
p. 315 The "ini1ial" c laim, apporently, was not disputed. R., p. 113 When this suit was filed, UJM 
benefits for the "initial" c.laim had not been paid, despite a request in writing. R, p. 192 After 
fil ing, the Hollands recovered 5200,000. plus a subrogation waiver from Mcllife. R., p. 54.55 
Because the Hollands had not been paid a penny for UJM coverage benefits before this 
lawsuit was fi led, and bcca'llse. they recovered $200,000, plus a waiver ofMe.tlife's subrogation 
interests. afle.r fil ing, the Hollands have ..:prevailed," as a matter of law, in this litigatio11. 




















(b) The disrricl court erred by dismissing the attorney's fees issue by virtue of granting 
MetLife1 s motion to enforce the settlement. 
The issues are: 1) what was the language used by the panies in their agree,nenL~. 2) what 
was the. panies' intent, and 3) whether there arc there any public policy concerns? 
It has long been held that, if possible. a court should stay within a contrac1 's four comers 
10 dc1em1ine its m<:.1ning. Burke Land & llvesiock Co. v Wells, 7 Idaho 42, 57, 60 P. 87, J 02 
( 1900) In construing agreements set fonh in rnuhipJe documents, the Coun of Appeals $lated: 
It is well settled that the temis of a written contract may be variecL modified, 
waived, {lf\ouJlr;d. or wh9tly .. se.U1Sid,r; bv UDY sul,$cgue,nLIY exec.uied <;Qnt@C\, 
whether th.at contract be in writing or parol. ( citations omitted] 
(l]he two instnunc.nts must be read and construed as one in order to determine the 
intent of the Parties and what pol'Uon o flhe agteement~ are still enforceable. 
[Citations omincd.J 
Olmslead v. Heidelberg Inn, Inc., I 05 Idaho 774, 778-79, 673 P.2d 76, 80-81 (CL App. 1983) 
(emphasis added) An agreement's wTitteit tenns are the best indicatio11 of the partie-s' intent. 
Str<wb. infra at 145 Idaho. at758 If panics enter into an agreement to end litiga1io11, and the 
arcemcnt, or slipulalion is silenl as to the issue of attorney's fees. no waiver wiH be implicd. ld. 
f urthcr. the S<:Ope of any release. ,vould be limited to mauers 001 contrary 10 public p0licy. 66 
Am. Jur. 2d RF.LEASE § 3 (201 I) Public policy is found in Idaho's insurance statutes. 11111 "· 
American Fam. Mui. ins. Co., Docket No. 3631 I, p. 4 (S.Ct. 201 J) (discussion ofUIM policies) 
The duty to raise policy issues is so strong that a court should do so sua sponre. Jd., p. 13 
The material fac1s in relation to this issue are; 1) the language used by the _parties' 
agreeme.ms, 2) the parties' iment, and 3) whe1her there ore any public policy issues'! 




















his undisputed that upon acccpL..vice. 1he panics· anomeys immedia1cly began 10 dispute 
what Ille tenn, "full release·· meant. R., p. 63, ~j 12 The parties anon,cys sent c:ich 01herdraft 
rel= that each wished 10 fulfill 1he February 2 and 3 ogreement. R .. pp. 230-33: su a/.w R .. 
pp. 258 Ea<h pany's release was unoccepiablc to 1hc olhcr party for various reasons. Id. The 
parties' resolution of1bcscope of the 1enn "full release" came by virtue of lhcjoindy-ncgo1ia1cd. 
~mutually agreeable" release." R.. p. 258 lmpor1an1ly, on February 23, 2010, Schroeder. 
aulhorized disbursal of lhe .1Ctdemen1 checks once 1hc tiollnnds exccuied 1hc rclcose. R., p. 241 
tn this case. the final terms of the parties· agreement can be found in three documents: 
the fust is the February 2 31ld 3. 2010 email c.<ehangc be1wecn counsel, 1he second is 1he join1Jy 
negotiated and drafted n,lc:a..,c, and 1hc third i• 1hc p.mic,' joini mo1ion and s1ipuh11cd order. ll., 
pp. 54-58; S<C! olw IL. pp. 45-18 The inten1 of 1he parties, a., evidenced by 1hc exprc,15 icrms 
contained in bolh the n,lcu, and slipul,nion, cle-•rly $how 1ha11111omcy'• fees were nol 
contemplated within lhc .ICOpC of lhc "'"'1 "ful I rcleo..., ... 
The langmgc of1he "mwuallysigrecablc" release expressly reserves lhc l'ccs issue: 
... that this Release abo co,'ta all claims dw were or could hnvc be.en mode .. . 
c•""l!! for Plaintiffs· Mo1ion for Attorney recs l'lJnuan, 10 J.C. § ~ 1-1839 mod on 
orobou1 Fd>nury 9, 2010 ... 
R .• pp. 54--SS (£1D2hasj1 jn ori&inal) Likewise, 1he por1ies' s1ipula1ion 1n dismiss s1111c,: 
ti .. Bill~ 1lut lrlkf· 1, le (oTio- up IOOW 1c-lc-phoat coafc-ttDC<- 0(1oday'i dmc. Pk-He ltt tllb kner mcmarialiu that 
)'OU ha\tc ~--.d. and I hrve ~ dw I •ill not dl'iburw ct. chccb 1n my poun.,ion ... 111 kas1 until )'OU ttnd I 
have hid a than~ to atk'mpt lo find some UIJICllll~~k re-~ ~1!WIKC: thlt i4 mepm,blc; to both out 
illw!J ... Al.llO, )'O'I had sprclf,c-4.llyn:qUC'llcd lMt I ,cad )'OU I copyo(IM p,opc)kd retcasc, tcforcn0td in my ollrllcr 
lcnc:r 10 )'011 ortoc1oy'1 dace- To Iha& end. ~enc i« ~ c:nclokd flft 1\111 tSlsN· t belio·e- the enclMim, once 
,laned, would N1i1fy 1he requtrcmtfl4 lhac lft)' cliccu prowidc • "'fullJmlK"' IO MetLife .. Should my undtt.uMdJng 
or lhc- 1J1u1ulon be tntCffl!C.'l, ple:ue k1 me l.now tmmcd•1dy .. (slt!~L~ R.., p. 2'1 






COME NOW the parties, by and through their counsel of record and hereby move 
this Court to dismiss, with prejudice, all claims in the above-captioned matter, 
except for Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839 filed on 
February 9, 2010 .... This motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(a)(l)(ii). The 
basis of this motion is that the parties have fully resolved all claims in this matter 
except for the pending motion for attorney fees referenced above. 
R., p. 46 ( emphasis added) The court's March 3, 2010 order also expressly excepted Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's fees from its order granting the joint motion to dismiss. R., pp. 46-4 7 
In regards to the parties' intent, the district court wrote: " ... MetLife argues attorney fees 
were not contemplated in the February 3, 2010, [email] agreement." R., pp. 455 Therefore, the 
court found that MetLife did not intend the email exchange to be inclusive of the entitlement to 
attorney's fees. The court continued, in regards to the Hollands' intent: 
Hollands believed they were settling a matter after suit had been filed and after 
their counsel had entered into a contingency fee agreement with them, so that an 
entitlement for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839 existed. 
Id. Thus, neither party intended the issue of fees to be included in the email exchange. 
MetLife may argue that the February 2 and 3 email exchange was operative to over-ride 
the subsequent release. Such an argument would ignore that it was the email exchange simply 
that gave rise to the other two documents. Such argument also ignores explicit language found in 
the release and the joint stipulation. R., pp. 54-56 
Further, it has long been Idaho's public policy that insurers pay their insureds' attorney's 
fees if the insurer does not pay within 30 days ofreceiving a proof of loss. I.C. § 41-1839(1); see 
also Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 524, 529, 537-40, 275 P.2d 969, 974, 
982-85 (1954) It is also Idaho's public policy that insured, injured victims of negligent drivers be 






compensated. DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288,294, 678 P.2d 80, 86 (Ct. App. 
1984) (stating that a case under LC.§ 41-1839 is a case with a "strong public policy favoring a 
certain type of litigant") Thus, it is public policy that insurers pay insureds' legal fees if they fail 
to pay the amounts justly due within 30 days of receiving proof of loss, and because legal fees 
are compensation to ensure that a recovery is not diminished by legal fees, any release could not 
include legal fees in its scope. 66 Am. Jur. 2d RELEASE§ 3 (2011) 
In this case, Mihara represented the Hollands pro bono through the insurance claims 
process. R., pp. 143-44 He only entered a fee agreement after MetLife told him that there was no 
coverage for the "additional" claims and after Paukert failed to honor her agreement that a 
coverage decision would be made by January 22, 2010. R., p. 62, ,r 9 The fee agreement only 
applied to recoveries from MetLife. R., p. 127 Mihara has recovered over $50,000 outside of this 
litigation for the Hollands and has obtained a subrogation waiver from MetLife. R., p. 29, ,r 10; 
see also R., pp. 54-55 The argument that pro-bono work is no reason to depart downward from a 
statutory award of fees was the only argument Mihara made that the court favored. R., pp. 401-
402 The court stated, "The arguments set forth by MetLife find no support in Idaho statutes, 
rules, or case law." R., p. 402 It would be consistent with public policy to award statutory 
attorney's fees to encourage pro bono work and so that portions of such recoveries can be 
donated to causes dedicated to persons oflimited means.22 R, pp. 351-52 
In sum, the district court over-stepped its discretion when it enforced the February 
agreement simply because it incorrectly determined that the Hollands had not met their burden 
22 The I.R.P.C. gives guidance to attorneys who receive awards of statutory attorney's fees in cases that they 
originally take pro bona. I.R.P.C. 6.1 (Note 4); see also R., p. 353 
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under Greenough and Brinkman. R., p. 412 Further, the court never took into account the public 
policy against legal fees eating into a recovery of insurance proceeds. 
(c) The district court erred to ho]d that MetLife had not waived objection to attorney's 
fees c]aimed by the HoHands pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6). 
The issue is whether the district court erred when it held that MetLife had not waived 
objection to the attorney's fees claimed by the Hollands pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6)? 
The applicable Idaho rule of civil procedure states: "Any objection to the allowance of 
attorney's fees, or the amount thereof, shall be made in the same manner as an objection to costs 
as provided by Rule 54(d)(6) ... " I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) (emphasis added) Rule 54(d)(6) requires 
objection to be made within 14 days. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) The rule provides: 
Any party may object to the claimed costs of another party ... by filing and 
serving on adverse parties a motion to disallow part or all such costs within 
fourteen (14) days of service of the memorandum of costs ... FaiJure to time]y 
object . .. shaH constitute a waiver of aH objections to the costs c]aimed. 
Id. ( emphasis added) 
It is well established that a request for attorney's fees filed prematurely shall be deemed 
filed timely. Crowley v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 106Idaho818, 683 P.2d 854 (1984) A failure to 
timely object to a claimed entitlement to attorney's fees waives any objection to the requested 
entitlement as well as the amount sought. Connor v. Dake, 103 Idaho 761, 653 P.2d 1173 (1982) 
A stipulated motion to dismiss a case and order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4l(a)(l), with 
prejudice, acts as final judgment on the merits of the claims. I.R.C.P. 4l(a)(l); see also Straub, 
supra 145 Idaho at 73, 762 
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The material facts related to this issue are, 1) the date that the Hollands filed their motion 
seeking entitlement to statutory attorney's fees, 2) the date that the district court entered 
judgment, and 3) the date that MetLife filed its objections to the Hollands' motion. 
Mihara filed the Hollands' motion, memorandum, and submitted an affidavit of counsel 
seeking entitlement to statutory attorney's fees on February 9, 2010. R., pp. 16-41 Schroeder 
filed his initial appearance on March 1, 2010. R., pp. 42-44 Schroeder filed the parties' I.R.C.P. 
41(a)(l)(ii) stipulated motion the same day. Id. The motion was based upon the fact that, "the 
parties have fully resolved all claims in this matter except for the pending motion for attorney's 
fees." R., pp. 45-48 The court entered a corresponding order on March 3, 2010. Id. 
Mihara had agreed not take action against MetLife until March 15, 2010 in order to give 
Schroeder time to research the attorney's fees issue. R., p. 243 On March 16, 2010, Schroeder 
told Mihara that the fees issue could only be resolved by the court. R., p. 381 
Pursuant to Crowley and Straub, supra, the motion filed on February 9, 2010 was deemed 
timely when the clerk entered the court's order on March 3, 2010. The forbearance agreed to by 
Mihara expired on March 15, 2010. As stated above, on March 16, 2010, Schroeder advised 
Mihara that the issue could only be resolved by the court. It was not until April 12, 2010, that 
MetLife filed its answer. Even if the time which Mihara agreed to not take action against 
MetLife was tolled, MetLife still took over 14 days to object to an award or amount of fees. 
Simply put, because MetLife's answer came after 14 days from when the Hollands' 
motion seeking statutory attorney's fees became at issue, MetLife waived all objections thereto. 






( d) The district court erred by denying the Hollands' motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8(d). 
The issue is whether averments of fact, which an answer does not deny, are admitted? 
The applicable rule of civil procedure sets forth that, "[ a Jverments in a pleading to which 
a responsive pleading is required ... are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading ... " 
I.R.C.P. 8(d) The rules provide that there shall be an answer to a complaint. I.R.C.P. 7(a) 
An answer that states the averments of the plaintiff are immaterial and do not require an 
answer has the same effect of admitting the averments. 61A Am Jur 2d PLEADING§ 296(2011) 
Facts admitted by pleadings need not be proved. Pendlebury, supra, at 465; see also 44A Am Jur 
2d INSURANCE§ 1950 (2011) 
The material facts in relation to this issue are, 1) what averments were plead in the 
complaint, and 2) what denials, if any, were contained in the answer? 
In this case, the Hollands made several averments of fact in the complaint that would 
support their entitlement to attorney's fees. R., pp. 8-15 Specifically, the Hollands averred that it 
had been beyond 3 0 days since they had furnished proof ofloss as provided by their policies ( on 
or about November 10 to 17, 2009), and MetLife had failed to pay amounts justly due. Id., 111 9, 
10, 13, 18 The Hollands averred that they had fully complied the terms of their policies before 
bringing suit. Id., 11 10 and 16 These averments were explicitly incorporated into paragraph 34 -
the paragraph setting forth the entitlement to attorney's fees, and which both the court and 
MetLife recognized as being at issue. Id., 123 





MetLife's answer did not deny any avennents contained in paragraphs 1 to 33 of the 
complaint. R., pp. 49-53 It did not even contain a general denial. Id. The answer reads: 
... no Answer is required as to paragraphs 1 through 33, as all claims, except the 
claim for I.C. § 41-1839 attorney's fees, alleged in paragraph 34 of the 
Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice ... 
As to the Plaintiffs' sole remaining claim, in answer to paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs' 
complaint, the Defendants deny that the Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees 
pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. All other allegations contained in paragraph 34 have 
been dismissed, with prejudice, and therefore, no answer is required ... 
R., p. 50 (emphasis added) At oral argument, Schroeder conceded the answer did not contain any 
denials to factual avennents contained in paragraphs 1 to 33. Tr., p. 30, 1. 7 to p. 31, 1. 17 He 
argued that the Rule 41(a)(l)(ii) stipulated motion and order only required MetLife to respond to 
paragraph 34 of the complaint and the motion for fees. R., pp. 312 The court wrote in July, 2010: 
It follows that only paragraph 34 on page 7 of the Complaint remained at 
issue ... The plain language of this Court's Order excepts only "Plaintiffs Motion 
for Attorney fees filed on February 9, 201 O"; therefore, no averments in the 
Complaint, even if deemed true, remain before the Court. In effect, all of the 
Complaint was dismissed with prejudice on February 3, 2010 (sic) ... 
R., p. 404-05 23 (emphasis added) The court's July, 2010 decision and order must be contrasted 
with its March 3, 2010 order. No language contained in the March 3, 2010 order says anything 
about dismissing the complaint, any part of the complaint, or any of its factual avennents. R., pp. 
45-47 The words "complaint," "avennents," and "factual allegations" are conspicuously absent 
from the court's order. Id. The court's later opinions and orders ignore the plain language of the 
release and stipulation, and corresponding March order that expressly reserves the fees issue. 
23 
C.j The date of the court's order cited above was March 3, 2010 versus the February 3, 20 IO date noted in 
excerpt cited. R., p. 47 The court later stated on October 6,2010, "[h]owever, no portion ofthis Court's July 20, 
20 l 0, Memorandum Decision and Order. .. in any way finds no factual allegations remained after the Order granting 
the Joint Motion to Dismiss was entered ... " (emphasis added) R., pp. 687-88 




















furthet. 10 1he extenl 1hal avermel\ts were admitted via the ple3'lings. purswnt to 
P,mdlt!bury. ~upra,. it W3S error for lhe coun to require the Hollands prove the-m. iL.. thal they 
had provided sufficienl proof of loss, and MetLife failed 10 timely p.1y 1hc claims. 
In couclusion, the applicable rule says that fa,cruaJ avennentS 1nade in a p!eading must be 
nnswcrcd by a pleading - the failure 10 do so resul1S in• judicial admission of those fucis. 
Simply puL the coun en-cd. as o maucr oflaw, when it denied 1he I lollands summary judgrnenL 
(e) 'l'ht HoUanch lf'f t'.t1dllrd 10 11ttoroey's (NS, costs, 2nd interest for this appeal. 
The Hollands seek auomcy·s fees, and r,:latcd COsls for 1his 11ppcal pursu;m1 to I.C. § 4 l-
1839(1 ). I.C. § 41-1839(2), 1./\.R. ndcs 35, 40, and 41. 
The nppcllate rulcs J)<O•idc lha1 • par,y claiming auomcy's fees should do so in its initial 
brier. I.A.R. 35(a)(5) The rule; P<Ovidc ro, the «>SIS of filing f=. 1he tranSCripL the record. and 
produclion of briefs. IAR. 40 If lhc Coun decides• party is entitled to fees and cosu, that JK1r1Y 
Sholl submit a n,cmornndum of cosu within 14 days of Ille Coun·s decision. l.A.R. 41 The Coun 
will decide the fee o.rnounl or will r,:mand the ,ssuc for determination. Id. 
If an insun:r fillls IO poy 1hc omoun1jusdy due under on insurnncc policy wi1hln 30 doys 
of reccip1 of• proof ofloss 1hcn th< lmurcr is lilblc for 1hc Insureds' nnomey's l'ces in any 
•cdon thcrcaflcr flied againSI 1L I.C. § 41-1839(1) Anorncy's fees are allowed for on appeal to 
rtC0\'"1' an ow:ird of fees in order to r!Ull:c the huu~ whole. Morrin. supro, 01 248,605 
The basis of the Hollands' cntidcmcn110 fees is 1ha1 they provided proper proof of loi>S to 
MetLife as discussed ubo,,: nnd Mctlifc foiled 10 timely poy. The Moll~nds arc ulso cn1i1lcd to 
judgmem based on the procedural argumcn1> se, ronh above. Th< con1lngcncy Jee agrccrnc,11 in 
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this case provides that the Hollands will compensa1e lheir attorney with -i0% of monies rece.1,ed 
after any appeals. R., p. 146 To date, the Hollands have received $".J)0,000, and• c:omplete 
subrogacion waiver ti-oin Me1Life. R., pp. 235-36 
In this case, an uward of SR0,000, plus interest., and related costs for this appeal is 
warrnnced due to Ll1e recovery oblaincd by che Hollands, che cenns oflhe rootingency agrc,ment 
noted ubove, nnd the amount of,\·or.k necessary 10 prosecute this man.er. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As in MaT1i11, tl1e proper focus oflhis case is th•• MCILifc should have paid !he Hollands' 
claims wilhin Llilny days of !he Hollands' proof of loss. A family Ihm has lost its only son should 
nn1 be Mkcd 10 compcn,atc !heir BltllrnCy oul of proceeds 1hcy should han: mxivcd prior 10 
having 10 tile a lawsui~ The llollnnds paid good money for their policies and had a righ110 have 
their t i aims be 1imely paid. 
The Holland, proy this Cnun """"" Ille: di$1nc1 <OUrt's emry ofjudgmenl. reverse and 
overrule 1he coun 10 !he cx1en1lb,i11bc cow, did 001 apply Idaho low, 1<> find 1ha1 the Hollands 
submincd odcquace proof of k>s$ prior IO 1huty days of being paid by MetLife, to find the 
I Jollnnds the prevailing ponte1 an lhls lltigocioo, to ""md a r,:i,soooblc onorncy's fee in the 
amounc of S30,000.00 pur$1W1t to I.C. § 41 -1 839(1) and (2), JAR Rules 35, 40, and 41, for costs 
of chis appc31, ond for any otlic,- rclicflhis Court fccb is proper. 
Re,p,,,cfully -..bmincd 10 the Cowl this Zit, ./l;i.y of Augu 1,201 
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